L’Humanité, Paris, WEDNESDAY, APRIL 15, 2026. Pp. 13–14
“The American side did not truly come to negotiate.”
MIDDLE EAST, INTERVIEW
An opponent of the Islamic Republic, Mohsen Kadivar, condemns the war waged by Washington and Tel Aviv and “directed against the Iranian people.”
“The space for democracy and freedom in post-war Iran has narrowed further.”
“Iranians defend their homeland, while remaining fervent critics of the system in place.”
Mohsen Kadivar is an Iranian jurist-theologian and Shia cleric. Imprisoned under the Shah’s reign, he also experienced the jails of the Islamic Republic for his criticisms of the doctrine of Velayat-e Faqih (rule of the supreme jurist), an innovation in Shia political thought instituted in Iran by Ayatollah Khomeini in 1979 and incorporated into the Iranian Constitution. In 1999, Kadivar was sentenced by the special tribunal for the clergy to eighteen months in prison for spreading false information about the “sacred system of the Islamic Republic” and for supporting enemies of the Islamic revolution. He was incarcerated in the notorious Evin Prison. In 2016, together with a group of Iranian intellectuals, he condemned the prosecution of Ayatollah Hossein-Ali Montazeri for publishing information about the execution of political prisoners in 1988. Mohsen Kadivar is today a professor of Islamic studies at Duke University in North Carolina (United States).
What should we make of the failure of negotiations? What strategy have the two sides adopted?
In the context of peace negotiations, it was far from certain that an agreement would be reached at the very first session, especially given the complexity of relations between Iran and the United States over the past forty-seven years. The first session generally unfolds as a mere diplomatic formality, and the conclusion of the first round of talks without an agreement — announced by the American vice president — should be interpreted as a tactical maneuver aimed at extracting greater concessions. Given President Trump’s statements regarding negotiations on a temporary ceasefire, it appears that Vice President J. D. Vance was seeking Iran’s unconditional capitulation, which Iran could obviously not accept. The United States has still not acknowledged that Iran holds the advantage, both in terms of warfare and in negotiations. It is for the United States and Israel to examine Iran’s ten-point proposal with realism. The American side did not truly come to negotiate to reach an agreement. The composition of the Iranian negotiating team reflects its genuine willingness to resolve mutual problems across the legal, political, military, and economic domains. The composition of the main American negotiating team, by contrast — two radical Zionists (Jared Kushner and Steve Witkoff, Donald Trump’s son-in-law and close friend respectively) and a vice president whose performance has been deeply disappointing — demonstrates that, as in the two previous rounds of talks, the United States views negotiation and diplomacy as a prelude to war and aggression. Following Vance’s ill-considered and hasty remarks upon leaving the negotiating table, the Iranian side responded with caution and restraint. Iran is holding firm on its ten-point proposals and is demanding sufficient guarantees against further aggression by the United States and Israel. Tehran has no intention of acquiring nuclear weapons and has the necessary flexibility to limit uranium enrichment. However, it demands an immediate end to Israeli aggression against Lebanon. Iran will accept no restrictions on its missile defense program, will maintain the Strait of Hormuz open on its own terms, and will not submit to force.
What is your view of the war being waged against Iran?
The military aggression of the United States and Israel against Iran was carried out in violation of international law and the American Constitution, unjustly, against American national interests, and without the consent of the majority of the American people. Throughout this offensive, Donald Trump and Benjamin Netanyahu committed numerous war crimes and violated the norms of humanitarian law. This aggression was aimed at bringing about the collapse of the Islamic Republic or turning it into a “failed state” by inciting civil war, installing leaders subservient to the United States and acceptable to Israel, partitioning Iran, destroying its nuclear arsenal, and annihilating its civilizational infrastructure in order to send it “back to the Stone Age.” Having killed more than 3,000 Iranians — the majority of them civilians, including nearly 300 children and 300 women — the two aggressors achieved none of their objectives. This war was directed against the Iranian people, the country’s territorial integrity, its civilization, and its culture, far more than against the Islamic Republic itself. This military aggression is a war of modern barbarism against a people and a country that refuse to submit to brute force, lawlessness, and injustice. President Trump fell into the trap set by the warmonger Netanyahu, and his slogan “America First” has in reality, translated into “Israel First.” Both wars (in June 2025 and March 2026) took place while negotiations between Tehran and Washington were underway.
What are its effects on the current regime, which shows no signs of collapse?
The Iranian people, deeply at odds with those in power, responded with unified support for the armed forces, deferring the resolution of the national conflict to the post-war period. The war has been a windfall for the leaders of the Islamic Republic, allowing them to temporarily conceal their many internal problems. The targeted assassinations carried out by Mossad generated public sympathy for the victims, who were elevated to the status of martyrs, and temporarily conferred legitimacy upon the radical minority in the face of a discontented majority. This war has had an extremely negative impact on the democratic and liberation movement in Iran, delaying it indefinitely. The power of the radical minority — made up primarily of Revolutionary Guards commanders — has now been considerably strengthened, and the space for democracy and freedom in post-war Iran has narrowed further.
The protests that erupted at the end of December 2025 and the “Woman, Life, Freedom” movement of 2022 highlighted the gulf between society and the government. How is this situation evolving?
Two distinct sets of problems must be identified. The first concerns the rule of law, social justice, and respect for freedoms, including the right to peaceful protest. The second concerns independence, territorial integrity, and defense capabilities. The fracture within the nation-state falls under the first category. That fracture is very real, and the war has only delayed its resolution. The Islamic Republic, particularly since 1989, has resisted any reform, however minor, and has suppressed peaceful protests. A majority of the population was opposed to the Islamic Republic, and yet those same people supported their country’s armed forces against the aggressor. Iranians firmly defend their homeland, while remaining fervent critics of the system in place. After the war, if the leaders do not swiftly undertake structural reforms, street protests will resume with greater intensity and scale.
Is the Velayat-e Faqih system — the religious jurisprudence that governs Iran — capable of reform?
This system has been reformed on three occasions. First, by Ayatollah Khomeini, who, by accepting the expediency of the system, laid the groundwork for the secularization of Shia jurisprudence. Second, in June 1989, when the Assembly of Experts appointed Seyyed Ali Khamenei as Supreme Leader, prioritizing political experience over legal knowledge and religious authority, qualities Khamenei lacked. Third, in January of this year, following the assassination of the second Supreme Leader, the Assembly of Experts symbolically installed Khamenei’s son as the third Supreme Leader. He was appointed by the commanders of the Revolutionary Guards. No reliable information is available regarding his physical or mental health, and no photographs, audio recordings, or videos have been released. The country is currently being governed without an active Supreme Leader — and rather effectively at that. Domestic affairs are managed by the president and the government; foreign and defense policy falls to the Revolutionary Guards. Unless proven otherwise, Velayat-e Faqih is a symbolic matter, and the country is run by the commanders of the Revolutionary Guards. Personally, I am in favor of a secular democratic republic in which Velayat-e Faqih and the political role of the military have no place.
What political alternatives are available to Iranians?
Four options present themselves to the Iranian nation. The first is the continuation of the Islamic Republic, which, even in the most optimistic scenario, would not secure more than 20% of the vote. The second is a constitutional monarchy; the son of the former Shah — a puppet of Netanyahu — has no future in Iran. The third is an Islamic Republic without the Velayat-e Faqih, inspired by the draft Constitution of 1979: a democratic religious government with a president elected by universal suffrage — an option supported by reformers, religious authorities, and citizens. The fourth is a secular democratic republic in which religious institutions are separated from the state, Parliament legislates, the president is elected by universal suffrage, and a Supreme Constitutional Court settles national disputes — an option favored by intellectuals, progressive reformers, and the educated classes. I have championed this option since 2009. The central question is the choice between the third and fourth options, which will be decided by referendum.
INTERVIEW CONDUCTED BY PIERRE BARBANCEY
